In September 2004, then-European Commissioner for Trade Pascal Lamy released his study on the political challenge of 'collective preferences' for the world trading system. Lamy defines 'collective preferences' as 'the end result of choices made by human communities that apply to the community as a whole'. The adoption of collective preferences by governments can complicate international trade when a good or service from an exporting country is not acceptable in an importing country. 
INTRODUCTION
In his final year as European Commissioner for Trade, Pascal Lamy initiated a study on the political challenge of 'collective preferences' for the world trading system. 1 The project proved controversial and Lamy's ideas received considerable criticism. 4 The response Lamy proposes is for the WTO to defer to national collective preferences. In particular, he urges formal guarantees that have a legal and a 'symbolic significance'. 10 With regard to future trade liberalization, Lamy suggests that 'it is advisable not to push for integration in areas rich in collective preferences'. 11 With regard to future WTO rules, Lamy points to the possibility of introducing an additional safeguard provision.
Such a safeguard would function as an 'insurance policy' to give a guarantee that trade integration will not intrude on legitimate collective preferences or be a threat to social choices. 12 In order to be justified in invoking this clause, a government would have to demonstrate a coherent underlying social demand in its country and that the measure being challenged is consistent with that demand. The government would also have to demonstrate that the measure does not restrict trade more than other measures capable of satisfying the social demand. Lamy's paper implies that collective preferences to be acknowledged cannot include protectionism. Thus, a plain tariff would not be an eligible measure for the collective preference safeguard.
Lamy distinguishes his proposal for a new safeguard clause from the existing WTO Agreement on Safeguards. One difference is that a government invoking the new safeguard would have to provide immediate compensation. 13 Lamy suggests that compensation could be a payment to affected exporters in other countries, or, in the case of harm to developing countries, could be the 10 Ibid, at 8.
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Ibid, at 9. 12 Ibid, at 10.
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Under the WTO Agreement on Safeguards, a Member invoking a safeguard is required only to 'endeavour' to maintain a substantially equivalent level of concessions. Uruguay Round Agreement on Safeguards, Article. 8.1. The Members concerned may agree on any adequate means of 'trade compensation for the adverse effects of the measure on their trade'. In the absence of suitable trade compensation, the affected exporting Members may engage in self-help to retaliate. Ibid Article 8.2 This right to retaliate may not be exercised for the first three years of the safeguard provided that the safeguard conforms to the Agreement and that there has been an absolute increase in imports. Ibid Article 8.3. provision of trade-related technical assistance. Lamy favors the principle of compensation because a country making social choices has a 'responsibility to bear the external cost of those measures '. 14 Another difference from the current WTO safeguard is that a country wishing to use the new escape clause would have to conduct an internal review of the collective preference in order to find out whether it is well-founded. This review would entail widespread consultation and further research.
If the preference is 'unwarranted', there should be a effort to educate people with a view to changing their preferences. 15 Lamy's paper is rich in nuance and thus hard to capsulate. Still, this brief summary can serve as a basis for an analysis of the ideas in Lamy's paper.
The purpose of this article is to contribute to the international debate on 'collective preferences,' and to offer some specific comments on Lamy's paper and its proposal for a collective preference safeguard. The article proceeds in six parts: Part I discusses the significance of the collective preference problem and takes note of some proposals that predate Lamy's paper. Part II examines the many challenges in validating a collective preference. Part III considers whether Lamy's proposal truly would add anything new to the WTO and concludes that it would. Part IV discusses the distinction between inwardly-directed and outwardly-directed preferences and their different dynamics. Part V posits that whether a new safeguard is needed depends to some extent on whether the interpretation of existing WTO provides sufficient leeway for diverse and legitimate domestic measures. Part VI concludes.
I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE COLLECTIVE PREFERENCE PROBLEM
The problem Lamy addresses is real. Countries will often adopt different public policies, and, as Lamy says, trade becomes as a 'natural point of intersection for different systems of collective 14 Above n 1, at 11. 15 Ibid. 6 preferences'. 16 Clashing or distinctive collective preferences between governments have led to trade disputes (e.g., hormones), and will assuredly do so in the future. When WTO rules inhibit domestic autonomy, that can undermine public support for the trading system. WTO practice, the complaining country will be authorized to impose prohibitive tariffs on A. Such a trade cutoff lowers economic efficiency. This reduction would not happen if A compensates the complaining country by granting it more trade access or by paying cash.
The calculation gets complicated, however, because one also has to consider the impact of the new rule on the adoption of new collective preference measures by A. If trade sanctions against it can now be avoided, then A may be more likely to gratify collective preferences, and that may lead to reductions in trade and efficiency. After all, the cost of compensation will not be borne directly by those in A who champion a preference. So the overall effect of a new safeguard on efficiency is indeterminate in the abstract.
Although collective preferences are a challenge for the trading system, they are hardly the new problem portrayed in Lamy's paper. It may be true that collective preference clashes have a greater saliency now than they did 20 or 100 years ago. Still, the challenge of social policies embedded in traded goods is hardly new.
18 It was the need to provide space for national policies that led to the negotiations in 1927 regarding the exceptions that would be introduced into the Ibid.
II. VALIDATING COLLECTIVE PREFERENCES
One of the most interesting parts of Lamy's paper is his discussion of the identification and validation of collective preferences. Two dialogic processes are noted. First, a government wishing to use the new WTO safeguard would have to conduct an internal review of the collective preference. Although Lamy's paper is sketchy, he seems to be saying that the government would instigate a reassessment of the collective preference to see whether it is a 'genuine' social expression and to see whether it is warranted. 29 If found to be 'unwarranted', then there would be an effort to educate people with a view to changing their preferences. 30 The second process is that a government would have to demonstrate to the WTO the genuineness of its collective preference by showing a coherent underlying social demand. Lamy does not elaborate the details of either process.
The implicit but unexamined assumption in Lamy's paper is that a popularly-supported policy has more international valence than a policy dictated by fiat. In other words, Lamy seems to be saying that the WTO should show greater respect for broad and intense public opinion than for policies chosen through bureaucratic expertise, judicial authority, or political representation.
As applied to the WTO, this is a revolutionary concept. The self-perception of the WTO is an organization comprised of impermeable 'Members'. At home, the members might be democratic states (like France), non-democratic state (like Cuba), or non-state customs territories (like Taiwan).
Yet inside the WTO, membership is homologous and those three categories have no relevance. As a consequence, no WTO rule or status is linked to the support of public opinion within a country. Above n 1, at 8.
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Ibid, at 11.
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The closest one gets is Article 3.1 of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Safeguards, which calls for a 'public hearing' in which interested parties can present their views on whether a safeguard would be in the public interest. See also Uruguay Round Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement and Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement), Articles 5.1, 5.4 (requiring the initiation of antidumping investigation when proposed on behalf of the domestic industry, with no status provided for contrary public opinion).
Lamy does not explain why this member-centrism should be uprooted. The paradigm of WTO decisionmaking is that governments speak for their citizens and that the WTO does not look inside the veil of the individual Member. 32 For example, the WTO does not require Members to demonstrate parliamentary approval for joining the WTO or amending its agreements.
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Consequently, Lamy is making a revolutionary suggestion in saying that whether a collective preference should qualify for a safeguard depends on the objective existence of an underlying social demand. Under existing practice across all WTO agreements, a government's mere assertion of a position would be sufficient at the WTO even if the position completely fails to reflect popular will within that country.
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Lamy's paper elides this normative issue as well as the practical problems the WTO faces in validating a collective preference. Such validation will be difficult enough for the European Union or the United States, but how is it to be done for China or Cuba? Moreover, if citizen support is to be a precondition for a collective preference safeguard, then perhaps it should also be a precondition for a The Agreement on Safeguards, Article 3.1, requires governments to entertain comments from interested parties regarding whether the safeguard would be 'in the public interest'. No WTO caselaw has suggested that a panel can second-guess whether a government properly decided whether a safeguard was in the public interest. In general, WTO rules do not require a government to take into account the costs of its own trade measure to its own economy. In United States -Gasoline, the Appellate Body held that the U.S. regulation violated the WTO because, inter alia, the U.S. government had not taken into account the cost of its regulation on foreign producers. Canada about the practice of using or exporting asbestos. My impression is that it did not. There could also be benefit in stimulating a public discussion before a government commences litigation in the WTO. In the hormones dispute, I do not know if U.S. public opinion would have supported lodging the case.
Social dialogue may also be of value in a defendant country losing a WTO case. This could occur if a special interest provision is found to be WTO-illegal and public opinion get aroused in favor of repeal. At present, there is no connection between the surveillance carried out by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) 40 and the domestic process for coming into compliance. By improving the transparency of the DSB, the WTO could tap into the power of public opinion. The greater ensuing public awareness might promote compliance. The 'budget cost' of Lamy's plan would be more expensive.
III. THE VALUE-ADDED OF A NEW SAFEGUARD
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Lamy says that compensation is to be 'pre-set'. Above n 1, at 11. I cannot imagine a workable formula. 48 Lamy suggests that exporters are only to be 'partially' compensated, but does not explain why compensation should be less than 100 cents on the Euro. Ibid. assistance or capacity building. 51 Lamy does not explain why developed country exporters are to be given more favorable treatment than developing country exporters.
Perhaps the reason is a presumption by Lamy that the injured exporters in the developed countries are not doing anything wrong while the exporters in developing countries probably are and so it would be unjust to compensate them directly. To take an example, the exporters in Myanmar using forced labor do not deserve compensation, while the exporters in the United States using hormones do because hormone use is not known to be unsafe. Whether or not this example 52 is convincing to the reader, it may demonstrate that the conditions justifying compensation are not found only in developed countries.
In Rodrik's social safeguard proposal, compensation would be required for democratic countries but not authoritarian ones. 53 The logic is that when Country A enforces its collective preference against Country B, if B is democratic, then the conditions in B reflect the persisting collective preferences of B's electorate. So A should acknowledge the conflict in preferences by compensating B. Rodrik has offered a normatively appealing bright-line rule, but its workability depends on being able to determine which countries are democratic.
The puzzle of who should get compensated is accompanied by the puzzle of why compensation should occur. Notions of 'international fairness and responsibility' justify compensation, according to Lamy's paper. He explains that 'our trading partners pay a heavy price 51 Above n 1, at 11.
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Bhagwati offers the example of compensating producers of factory-farmed chickens. He says that 'the payment is likely to be regarded as paying sinners for not practicing vices!'. Bhagwati, above note 27, at 152. 53 Above n 24, at 66-67.
for some of our domestic choices'. 54 This gives the countries pursuing a collective preference the 'responsibility to bear the external cost of those measures'.
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This argument seems to imply that the rationale for the compensation is the transborder financial harm rather than the WTO-illegality of the collective preference. That would be a farreaching justification for compensation because it would also apply to commercial policies such as tariffs and quotas. If the European Community has a low import quota for meat, it is exacting a 'heavy price' on foreign producers just as much as when the Community has a ban on hormones.
Lamy presumably is not suggesting that governments using tariffs or employing trade remedies have a responsibility to compensate the frustrated foreign exporters. Nor is he suggesting that measures ostensibly taken for national security (and thus exempt from many WTO rules) should trigger shows the world that its safeguard is for altruistic reasons not commercial ones.
Another issue that Lamy does not discuss is the difficulty that lower-income countries would face in providing financial compensation. If Countries A and B both inhibit the same dollar value of trade with Country C, then both countries would owe C's exporters a commensurate amount of compensation. But if A is a high-income country and B is a low-income country, then B may be less able to pay the compensation, and thus less able to keep the collective preference.
54
Above n 1, at 11.
55
Ibid.
B. Legitimizing Preferences
Lamy contends that his proposed safeguard clause is the 'ultimate guarantee that trade integration will not pose a threat to legitimate collective preferences'. 56 Furthermore, he states that 'The outcome of conflicts involving collective preferences would be much the same as today but the existence of a safety net like a safeguard clause would enable the parties concerned to achieve that outcome without generating so much tension and friction'. 57 The avoidance of the tension and friction would come, presumably, because the safeguard would legitimize the continuation of the contested trade measure notwithstanding WTO rules. In other words, WTO members could keep their community preferences so long as they were willing to pay for them through compensation.
Given that description of Lamy's plan, the question arises whether it amounts to any real difference from current WTO law. After all, the WTO does not really 'strike down' national laws, even though commentators sometimes say that. 58 A WTO Member can refuse to lift a trade barrier ruled to be a WTO violation as Europe did in the hormones dispute and the United States did in the Byrd Amendment dispute. Everyone would agree that ultimately, achieving compliance is up to the government found to be in violation.
Where there is a disagreement is whether WTO rules give the defending government a formal obligation to comply or merely an obligation to accept retaliation should it not comply. John H.
Jackson has championed the notion that governments do have an obligation to comply. 59 62 This disconnect between the Community's legal responsibility and its internal political capacity to make the required change has proved embarrassing. The new safeguard would provide an escape clause for governments in such circumstances.
The other major innovation is to enable the government with the WTO-illegal collective preference to buy its way out rather than to suffer a 'suspension of concessions or other obligations'
('SCOO') selected by the complaining party. Agreed trade compensation will continue to be possible under Lamy's proposal as it is now. But Lamy's plan adds an additional option not plainly available now of paying non-trade compensation.
IV. WHAT TO DO ABOUT OUTWARDLY-DIRECTED PREFERENCES
Lamy's paper does not discuss whether there are to be limits to the range of permissible preferences.
Two types of preferences are at stake-(1) inwardly-directed preferences, for example, regarding food wholesomeness, and (2) outwardly-directed preferences, for example, to preserve tropical forests in other countries. 63 The paper discusses both types, so presumably Lamy is not making a distinction between them. Among the outwardly-directed preferences he discusses are turtle protection, death penalty, forced labor, and child labor. He also states that 'Most of the difficulties with collective preferences arise when countries think that their choices should apply to everyone, not just to them'. 64 In my view, the dichotomy between inwardly and outwardly-directed preferences is important. This distinction is not an question of 'processes and production methods' 65 because PPMs are used for both inward and outward preferences. 66 Rather, the dichotomy hinges on the purpose of the contested governmental measure. Food safety measures like Europe's hormone ban may set standards for practices in the United States, but the ostensible purpose of the measure is to protect the health of European consumers. The distinction gets murky, however, because any outwardly-directed measure will have been stimulated by the volitions of individuals inside the regulating country. For example, the United States law banning imports of dog and cat fur products 67 is outwardly-directed, but the law also satisfies a demand inside the United States for taking this action. Nevertheless, there is a difference between the two types of preferences, particularly in their interface dynamics.
The outwardly-directed measure is more problematic because of the potential clash in the collective preferences chosen by importing and exporting countries. The people of the United States 63 may have a collective preference for preventing the slaughter of dogs and cats for fur, but the people of China (for example) may have a preference for engaging in such slaughter. This is not a conflict of law because the United States is not trying to make pet slaughter unlawful in China. Rather, it is a clash of collective preferences. Trade in dog and cat fur is being stymied by the collective preferences in the United States failing to match the collective preferences in China. 68 If the U.S. ban is ever ruled WTO-illegal, Lamy's safeguard would allow the United States to keep the ban so long as it compensates the producers in China. (One wonders though whether U.S. public opinion would tolerate using U.S. taxes to pay off Chinese animal skinners any more than U.S. public opinion would tolerate repealing the law.)
The dog fur example shows the complexity of the interface possibilities. For an inwardlydirected preference like meat produced without injected hormones, the clash between preferences is limited because European consumers can enjoy non-hormone meat and the U.S. consumers can enjoy the hormone meat. The trade dispute can be worked if U.S. producers ship non-hormone meat to Europe or if Europe compensates the United States. 69 For an outwardly-directed preference like a ban on fur trade, there is a greater clash in preferences because if the U.S. ban does not prevent the animal slaughter, then the United States cannot achieve that objective in China. The only benefit from the U.S. ban would be to prevent U.S. moral complicity. For other outwardly-directed preferences, the interface will be much harder because it will not be possible for both sides to continue to enjoy their preferences. These are the challenges where international collective action is needed. Take climate change, for example, where Europe has a greater collective preference for taking action than does the 68 The fact that China produces and exports such fur shows that China has a preference of some sort for the dog and cat killing. Today, 11 U.S. cattle producers are certified to raise cattle for eventual beef shipments to Europe. Clayton, above n 62.
United States. If Europe were to impose an emissions tax on U.S. imports, and it does not induce U.S. cooperation, then the tax will not accomplish anything for Europe toward satisfying its preferences of preventing climate change. Unlike the dog fur ban, where Lamy's safeguard would allow the United States to continue excluding the fur, for climate change, the safeguard would not offer any benefit to Europe if it has to compensate U.S. exporters for the emissions tax. The same obstacle exists for other issues where collective preferences need to be translated into international collective action, for example, fishery conservation or the prevention of nuclear proliferation. This category of issues is characterized by substantial transborder physical externalities and is sometimes referred to as 'global public goods'. The usefulness of the collective preference safeguard for global public goods seems doubtful.
Would the collective preference safeguard be more justifiable for inwardly-directed than outwardly-directed measures? Arguably so, yet one also has to consider an issue not addressed much in Lamy's paper-that is, whether WTO rules leave enough discretion for domestic measures. Lamy seems to think that the rules do. He states that the WTO Appellate Body 'has been a faithful guardian of "collective preferences" under the WTO system'. 70 This view is echoed by the WTO Secretariat which asserts on the WTO website that 'Compliance with WTO Agreements does not in any way reduce the right of a government to make laws for its own territories'. 71 In my view, such assurances may not be justified. As WTO disciplines get interpreted more stringently, the need for a collective preference safeguard would increase. Part V looks at this issue.
V. SUPERVISION OF DOMESTIC POLICY BY WTO RULES 70
Above n 1, at 7. Table 1 below shows many of the ways in which WTO rules can potentially prevent nonprotectionist domestic measures designed to achieve collective preferences. The intent in Table 1 is to consider only inwardly-directed preferences. In a few instances, footnotes are added where the entry may be obscure. Today, the SCM Agreement is less deferential to domestic autonomy than it was in 1995. Article 8 of the SCM Agreement identified certain subsidies that were to be non-actionable. These domestic subsidies were designed either to correct market failures or to promote redistributional objectives. Unfortunately, WTO Members allowed this provision to expire in 2000.
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For example, Anti-Dumping Agreement, Article 18.1.
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Stewardship of the global commons is not solely externally-directed because every nation shares in the commons. a longtime U.S. antitrust law was found to violate the Anti-Dumping Agreement. 'damage of the measure to the multilateral negotiating framework', and then decided that this alleged damage was enough for it to refuse to accept the narcotics control effort as a health measure. 84 In my view, when the availability of the GATT's public policy exceptions hinges on the commercial impact of the measure on other countries, the WTO dispute system will be engaging in inter-country comparisons of utility. Such judgments will be hard to make in a principled and predictable fashion. national 'value'. 85 In European Communities -Tariff Preferences, the panel did not explain how one determines when national actions damage the multilateral trading system.
In the first 'General Exceptions' case adjudicated under the GATS, the panel held that for a measure to be 'necessary' under the moral exception in GATS Article XIV(a), the United States was required to negotiate with Antigua to see if a way could be found to avoid the harm associated with the internet gambling services that Antigua's private sector was offering to U.S. residents. 86 The fact that the United States had not entered into negotiations was a key reason why it lost the case at the panel level. The panel went so far as to say that U.S. negotiation with Antigua was required even if the United States considered the gambling ban 'indispensable'. 87 Note that the panel did not suggest that seeking to negotiate was a principle of international law that serves a backdrop to the GATS.
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Instead, the panel discovered the requirement to negotiate by employing the Appellate Body's 'weighing and balancing' test. 89 As has often happened in GATT/WTO jurisprudence of public policy exceptions, panels seem eager to add substantive and procedural hurdles not present in the treaty text. 6.529-6.533. In reaching this conclusion, the panel found relevant a similar holding given in the panel decision in the first tunadolphin case. Ibid para. 6.526 and n. 980 (recalling the Appellate Body's dictum that panels might find unadopted GATT panel reports to offer useful guidance). In my view, any time a WTO panel follows the reasoning of the unadopted 1991 and 1994 tuna-dolphin reports, the results will prove as mischievous for the WTO as they did for the GATT.
87
United States -Gambling, above n 86, para. 6.534 (suggesting that for a state's trade measure to be 'necessary' under GATT Article XX, the state should first pursue other appropriate measures such as diplomatic overtures or foreign assistance). 88 Cleveland, above n 82, at 166.
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United States -Gambling, above n 86, para. 6.477.
In taking note of this jurisprudence, I do not mean to suggest that no national collective preference is safe at the WTO. My point only is that the evolution of the jurisprudence on public policy exceptions should be a central factor in considering whether a new safeguard is needed. In contending that WTO dispute system 'has been a faithful guardian' of collective preferences, Lamy's paper skips over important legal and factual questions. In my view, such a safeguard will become more urgent if trends continue in the WTO to denigrate the exceptions. Let me reiterate that my analysis focuses on inwardly-directed preferences. The WTO jurisprudence on outwardly-directed preferences is another matter. Perhaps Lamy's view on guardianship is colored by a misunderstanding. For example, he sees the Appellate Body decision in United States -Shrimp as 'departing' from a 'strict jurisdictional reading' of GATT Article XX(g), and his paper seems to favor that broader geographic scope. 90 In fact, however, the Appellate Body did not make that departure.
V. CONCLUSION
In an interconnected world, value-free trade is a fiction. Individuals, groups, and governments are sure to have preferences about international commerce that will complicate voluntary transactions between buyer and seller. Recognizing this difficulty, Lamy wants the WTO to experiment with a new safeguard for collective preferences that violate WTO rules. Lamy is trying to safeguard democratic choices at the national level from being overridden in the WTO. Equally important, he is trying to safeguard the WTO from a free market zeal that could undermine public support for the trading system. Lamy's purpose is apposite in my view. problem is that many governments would oppose the idea and demand a high front-end payment for accepting it even though each recourse to the safeguard entails a compensatory payment Thus, I predict a continuation of the status quo in which powerful governments retain WTO-illegal collective preferences and suffer any ensuing SCOO.
Lamy's attention to the process of domestic validation has independent merit. Governments exposed to pressures for unwise collective preferences can do a better job engaging in deliberation and promoting public education. Expecting politicians to exhibit that kind of leadership may be utopian.
